We evaluated the navigational performance of commercial airline pilots in simulated free flight conditions using two cockpit displays of traffic information (CDTI). One display presented minimal essential navigation information. The other added color-based time-to-contact (Tc), minimum-range, and altitude intent information. New metrics of separation maintenance were developed. Results indicated performance gains for the CDTI that automatically calculates and displays conflict-alerting information. Recommendations are made for advanced avionics for use in free flight.
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is beginning to allow limited point-to-point free flight by commercial aircraft. Free flight involves allowing en-route navigation decisions currently made by air traffic controllers to be made by pilots. It is postulated that free flight will be more efficient in terms of time and money (RTCA, 1995) .
Part of the evaluation of the free flight concept involves assessment of a ground-or cockpit-based conflict probe. A conflict probe is a computer-based methodology capable of predicting difficulties in keeping aircraft properly separated.
In practice, separation errors are defined by the FAA as any failure to maintain 9.3 km (5 nm) lateral and 305-610 m (1000-2000 ft) vertical separation (altitude-dependent) . This is the so-called cylindrical "protected zone" surrounding each aircraft.
Research into the safety of free flight has generated mixed results. Battiste, Johnson, Delzell, Holland, Belcher, and Jordan (1997) and Lozito, McGann, Mackintosh, and Cashion (1998) indicated that when pilots were given a CDTI with a conflict probe, long lookahead times (e.g. 8 minutes), plus a premaneuver solution-testing tool, they appeared capable of maintaining error-free separation under a variety of traffic situations.
In contrast, Scallen, Smith, and Hancock (1996) , Smith, Lewin, and Hancock (1996) and Smith (1998) came to a somewhat different conclusion. Given a minimalistic CDTI (which was nonetheless more sophisticated than those which many aircraft currently use) they found separation failure rates as high as 67%. Barhydt and Hansman (1997) reported error rates of approximately 25-58% using a variety of displays with and without conflict probe, and demonstrated statistical significance for both error rate and time-to-maneuver in favor of probe-based displays.
One factor obscuring comparison between these studies is scenario difficulty. "Safe" free flight is highly dependent on situational difficulty, coupled with the degree of technology and training brought to bear on that difficulty.
Scenario specifics like traffic density, the initial placement of aircraft, their relative headings and speeds, and the degree and type of altitude changes, combine in complex ways to make navigation more or less difficult. Furthermore, the presence of an onboard conflict probe and a pre-maneuver solution-testing tool seem to help matters greatly.
The current study was designed to determine if a conflict probe alone was capable of enabling pilots to navigate safely through high-stress scenarios, and to what relative degree would the probe influence performance in comparison to other factors such as situational difficulty and individual differences.
METHOD
Using the glass-cockpit flight simulator in the Human Factors Research Laboratory at the University of Minnesota (described in Scallen et al., 1996) sixteen commercial airline pilots (1 female, 15 male, mean total flight hours 10,600, SD 4,400) used two versions of CDTI to help them navigate through five simulated en-route crossing conflict situations with the goal of maintaining safe separation, defined as 9.3 km (5 nm) lateral, 305 m (1000 ft) vertical, not alititudedependent. A conflict probe was available in one of the two displays; otherwise circumstances were identical.
Information on intruder altitude, heading, and airspeed was available in a text data tag near each aircraft symbol. This was updated once per second to allow estimation of altitude changes.
The conflict alerting logic was deterministic, meaning it expressed the probability of conflict as either "yes" or "no". A deterministic probe was chosen on the assumption that future commercial aircraft will have cybernetically controlled trajectory capability, as well as access to highly accurate global positioning satellite information.
On the basis of prior research the probe's lookahead value was set at four minutes. Knecht and Hancock (1997) found that two minutes was sufficient for resolving most simple two-ship conflicts in the absence of distractor aircraft. Barhydt and Hansman (1997) also noted little additional benefit to error rates beyond two minute lookahead in singleconflict situations including three distractor aircraft.
In the advanced Tc display, probe-predicted non-conflicts were displayed onscreen as white symbols, while conflicts were colored orange. Additionally, yellow was used to indicate illusory conflicts--those due to aircraft appearing to conflict, but which would not, due to pilot intent to level off at a safe distance.
A within-subjects experimental design was used, with repeated factors of both display and scenario. Within-subjects designs are statistically sensitive, but can introduce presentation order effects, including fatigue, learning over time, and assymetrical transfer effects (Poulton, 1982) . These effects were addressed by giving no indication to pilots that scenarios would be repeated, by giving them as much practice time as they cared to take before data collection, and by counterbalancing the treatment presentation order for both display and scenario.
The five scenarios were presented as either "nc-first"--by showing them with the standard no-color display first, followed by same-order repetition with the advanced Tc display--or else in "tc-first" order. Before each change of display, a retraining session was conducted. Half the participants received each display order. Within each half, the order of scenario presentation was counterbalanced.
"High stress" airspace was defined here by restriction of available maneuvers. The scenarios had no more than six intruders per five-minute scenario, but we placed intruder aircraft to block two, and sometimes three, of the basic ownship maneuver options per scenario.
During each trial, separation was assessed with three metrics, each of which described a different aspect of performance. Red alerts described the integer number of protected zone violations. This modeled the FAA's "zero error-tolerance" stand on safety.
A new minimum-range metric rmin described the single lateral (xy-plane) point-of-closest-approach during each scenario. This was defined as the normalized geometric separation distance defined by (1)
where C xy was the "critical distance", or size of the protected zone in the xy-plane, C z was the critical distance in the vertical (z) dimension, r xy was the lateral range (separation distance) and r z the vertical range. Finally, a new measure of airspace intrusion was constructed, which we termed niti, the normalized intrusiontime integral. Niti was designed to embody the notion that conflict severity is a function of both separation and time, i.e. 
where "start" was the red-alert starting time and "end" its ending time.
Niti gives a simple, linear estimation of protected-zone penetration. It factor-weights in favor of simultaneous deep penetrations in all three dimensions, and against superficial penetrations in any single dimension. Its instantaneous value ranges from 0-1.0, peaking when separation is simultaneously zero in x, y, and z, (direct impact).
Typical values for minor penetrations are small numbers on the order of .1-1.0 or so, depending on one's personal standard for "severity". High numbers (e.g. our highest observed value of 103.5) represent catastrophic separation failure, and generally correspond to small rmins coupled with long event durations on the order of 30-60 seconds or more.
Performance data for all three metrics were adjusted to discard patently minor errors (e.g. tiny altitude overshoots into a protected zone). These were defined as any with values of niti < 0.05.
RESULTS

General Observations
Based on the raw score results presented in Table 1 , there appeared to be an advantage to having an onboard conflictprobe in short-lookahead, high-stress tactical free flight situations.
Even though this probe did not calculate solutions, it did appear to achieve what was intended, which was simply to ease the job of detecting the conflicts themselves. Table 2 
. Summary statistics for distributions of difference scores for matched-pair data sets ((nc -tc) scores for each subject in each scenario).
Statistical Issues
Data frequency distribution normality emerged as a critical concern. A combination of phenomena led to this abnormality and managing it became a serious statistical consideration. Table 1 summarizes the raw-score findings.
The substantial number of no-error runs skewed the raw frequency distributions. Rmin was more normal, since it was not subject to any fixed initial limit, but red alerts and niti suffered predictably from the problems endemic to any metric with a lower fixed limit.
A second bias toward non-normality was also predictable. Pilots logically tend to avoid other aircraft. This is a "hard limit" fixed around the boundaries of the protected zone. On the other hand, they also want to alter course as little as possible in the interest of efficiency. So amount of deviationfrom-path is a "soft limit" based on multiple individual criteria, including experience and confidence.
As Table 2 shows, distributions of difference scores "behave better" than raw scores in these cases. Nonetheless, in all three measures the problem of normality remained. Only rmin passed even a preliminary, lax normality screen based on a z-score probability defined by p z Skewness Std. Error of Skewness =     (3) (Bliss, 1967) and no measure passed the more-stringent Lilliefors test (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) . In the case of red alerts this was not surprising, since raw data values were constrained to be integers.
Data were therefore transformed to minimize thirdmoment skewness using a power function (X+k) λ , k being a constant. Rasmussen (1989) addresses transformations and their effects on Type I error, and lobbies for a modest p-value correction (e.g. choosing .04 to maintain a nominal .05 level).
However, even though transformation produced major improvements in skewness, in our judgment the Lilliefors results were insufficient to justify using ANOVA for our data evaluation.
Therefore, the values we emphasize here are the result of Wilcoxon's rank sum test. Values for the sign test are also reported for the sake of comparison. The sign test is the least powerful of the standard non-parametrics, but also has the fewest distributional assumptions (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999) .
Main Effects
According to the Wilcoxon results with the Rasmussen correction, there were main effects for red alerts and niti (p =.04). Rmin (p =.05) missed significance by such a small margin that we choose to discuss it as well.
There was superior collision-avoidance performance with commercial airline pilots using the conflict-probe CDTI. Pilots displayed fewer discrete separation failures, had greater average points-of-closest-approach and showed lower overall severity on the failures that did occur.
However, any judgment concerning effect should be tempered by an estimate of effect size. One such measure is estimated z-units (Glass and Hopkins, 1984) , given by deltahat∆
The effect sizes of reds/niti/rmin (.30/.34/-.24) are seen to be somewhat modest using this criterion. This implies that other considerations, such as conflict severity and individual differences in resolution ability, should be of more future concern than conflict detection alone.
Treatment Order Effects
Treatment order effects are a problem of within-subjects designs. We counterbalanced the treatment order to control for this, but believed it critical to test for assymetrical transfer, fatigue, practice, and Ebbinghausian "savings-in-learning" effects, since each subject experienced each scenario twice.
All sixteen pilots reported they had no knowledge that scenarios had been repeated. However, some performance effects may occur unconsciously, so statistical evaluation was conducted.
Performance scores were first sorted by presentation order. Regression analysis showed no statistically significant overall performance relationship with time on any measure. Although regression lines uniformly sloped in a direction consistent with fatigue effects, the slopes for reds/niti/rmin (+.01/+.38/-.01) were not significant (2-tailed t(8), p = .39/.23/.28).
To assess assymmetrical transfer, scores were sorted by "tc-first" vs. "nc-first". Subsequent analysis showed no significant effects for the order of display presentation (reds/niti/rmin 2-tailed t(14), p =.25/.34/.24). From this we may infer that, if proactive and/or retroactive inhibition effects were at work, at least they appeared in somewhat equal balance across display order, and thus did not constitute a causal alternative to the main effects previously described.
Catastrophic Separation Failure
Rmin and niti allowed a fine-grain examination of what could be called "catastrophic" separation failure. These results were not analyzed statistically, due to the fact that the definition of "catastrophic" can be considered arbitrary. However, sample values are presented in Table 3 to give a feel for the concept of how changing one's threshold definition of catastrophe affected the number one would see in the data. Keep in mind that units in niti and rmin are normalized. So, for example, an rmin of .06 could correspond to either a pure lateral separation of about 556 m (1823 ft) or a pure vertical separation of 18.3 m (60 ft). So a "mathematical catastrophe" may or may not coincide with an experiential one. A lateral miss of 1823 ft would not feel as frightening as a vertical miss of 60 ft. But, according to the dimensions of the protected zone, they are equivalent.
We have no simple explanation for these catastrophies at this time. Some seemed due to pilot inattention. At other times, pilots appeared to mistrust the accuracy and reliability of the probe and spent time searching for conflicts no matter what the probe indicated. It is likely that a tendency to remain in conflict-detection mode diverted cognitive resources away from solution-finding.
DISCUSSION
The most significant finding in this study is the overall error rate of 41% for commercial airline pilots in simulated free flight. This is error as the FAA currently defines error-discrete failure to maintain minimum mandated separation.
This elevated rate contrasts with the results of the Battiste, et al. (1997) study, and is more consistent with Barhydt and Hansman (1997) . Whether this was due to lack of a premaneuver solution-testing tool, or perhaps unreasonable scenario difficulty, or both was unclear. We therefore sought to assess whether or not our scenarios were simply unrealistically challenging. This was done by two means.
In our debriefing questionnaire we asked if pilots generally felt able to avoid the aircraft conflicts they had encountered. The mean score on a 7-point scale was 5.9 (s.d. 1.0). This supported the notion that the scenarios were challenging, but not impossibly so.
Additionally, we asked the pilots point-blank if, based on their experience, they thought the scenarios were unrealistic. Without exception, the answer was that they were very challenging, but not unlike situations they themselves had encountered.
We therefore conclude that free-flight safety will be very much a function of future technology. A conflict probe can help-but cannot be relied on as the sole aid to tactical collision avoidance. Conflict detection-while a challenging task-is not as challenging as conflict resolution. Tactical free flight under high-stress situations can be expected to be highly problematic unless effective conflict detection and resolution aids are part of the technology available to all. Further research is necessary to ensure development and testing of these aids. From a human factors standpoint, they will need to calculate and make salient the information most relevant to both conflict detection and resolution.
